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BAR BRIEFS

disability after permanent partial disability. A workman was killed in
the course of employment through the negligence of a third party
(R. R. Co.). The dependents of the deceased sued the third party,
recovering more than could have been recovered under the compensation
act. The employer's insurer paid the two $5oo awards into the special
funds, and then brought suit against the third party for these amounts.
HELD: That the insurer was entitled to recover from the party causing
the death. "It can not be said that in providing for the recovery of the
loss sustained by the dependents or next of kin of a deceased, the State
has exhausted its authority to provide redress for the wrong. The
State may permit the recovery of punitive damages in an action by
the representatives of the deceased in order to strike effectively at the
evil to be prevented. . . The State might, also, if it saw fit, provide
for a recovery by the employer for the loss sustained by him by reason
of the wrongful act. The wrong may also be regarded as one against
the State itself, in depriving the State of the benefit of the life of one
owing it allegiance. For this wrong the State might impose a penalty.
. . And it is well settled that the mode in which penalties shall be
enforced, and the disposition of the amounts collected are matters of
legislative discretion."
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
McDonnell vs. Monteith: Plaintiff sustained a comminuted fracture of the radius, with bruises, lacerations, and burns from friction
between a pulley and belt. He consulted defendant, a practicing
physician. The latter took no X-ray, applied splints, treated the wounds,
and gave directions for care. Testimony is in conflict as to whether
plaintiff obeyed doctor's instructions. About three months later continuance of pain caused plaintiff to have X-rays taken, which disclosed
nont-union, and conditions requiring open operation. This was performed by another doctor, the final result being a crooked and stiff
arm. Verdict for plaintiff, followed by entry of judgment notwithstanding. HELD: New trial granted. The causes for the final result
are mere matters of conjecture, and verdict can not be sustained. While
a physician is not an insurer of a correct diagnosis or correct treatment,
the exercise of a reasonable degree of care and skill is required, particularly after the discovery of unusual conditions and symptoms.
Failure to conform to all reasonable directions of the attending physician,
or conduct contributing to the final result, nullify right of recovery.
Sufficiency of defendant's subsequent care presented a question for the
jury, likewise the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. A verdict
must be based upon proof that is reasonably certain and definite. The
calling of a physician by plaintiff waives the provisions of Section
7923, C. L; 1913.

THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Paul P. Ashley, of the Seattle Bar, has a fine article in the
September issue of the American Bar Association Journal, on the
"Unauthorized Practice of Law." In this he points out the inadequacy
of many enactments that seek to define the practice of law, because "they
are not limited so as to include only those acts and functions which are
exclusively legal."
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"It cannot be denied," he says, "that many acts and functions
proper to the lawyer's office-and for the doing of which he is especially
trained-are also proper to other offices. We cannot successfully
demand that the realtor refuse to answer every question involving legal
knowledge; that the insurance expert refrain from explaining the
legal significance of an insurance trust. The accountant will continue
to prepare tax returns, and explain the law to his client. Corporations
and natural persons not legally trained are doing, and apparently will
continue to do, many things properly done in a law office. It would
be tilting at a mill to seek to make exclusively ours those functions
which though properly ours are enjoyed by us as tenants in common
with others. Yet it seems that this overlapping of legitimate fields of
endeavor is often ignored. Lawyers search for protective barriers without realizing that they may be attempting to inclose common ground.
Definitions actually used in efforts to stifle the unauthorized practice
of law show this tendency. . . And so we need a general acceptance of
a new type of definition. We need a delineation of the field which is
exclusively legal; a definition which excludes the activities of bankers,
realtors, tax advisers, insurance experts, accountants, investment counsel,
ad infinitum. We need a definition comprehending all matters which
should be ours exclusively, yet not including activities which are ourscompetitively. More important, the public needs such a delineation for
its guidance and protection. . . Legislatures, which have balked at
omnibus definitions, might enact a more restrained definition-and give
teeth for its enforcement."
AIR LAW JOURNAL
We are in receipt of Volume i Number i of The Journal of Air
Law, which appears to be the joint effort of Northwestern University
School ofLaw, University of Southern California School of Law, Washington University (St. Louis) School of Law, and The Air Law Institute.
The more interesting articles in the first number are: Germany
and the Aerial Navigation Convention at Paris, Carriage of Passengers
by Air, Public Utility Air Rights, and The Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity Applied to Air.
Editorially, Professor Wigmore, of Northwestern, points out that
the publication is intended to supply a central organ, a clearing-house
for exchange of experiences, in the hope that the era of settled air law
may be brought about more speedily, and without the fumbling which
accompanied the definition of legal rights in other fields.
NEGLIGENCE OF STATE EMPLOYEES
We quote the following from the July, issue of the Los Angeles
Bar Association Bulletin: "In Heron vs. Riley, 79 Cal. Dec. 487, decided
May 31, 1930, the Supreme Court passed upon the constitutionality of
the new Section 17142 of the Civil Code, which provides that the State,
and Counties, cities, and other political- subdivisions, shall be respon.sible for the negligence of their officers, agents, or employees in the
operation of motor vehicles. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this section, thus making it proper for the State to be
sued in such cases."

